(EN) [Metaphysics] Of God's Justice, Veracity and also of the Trinity, Grounded on Plato. - Theophilus Gale

Jul 18, 2024

CHAP. VI. Of God's Justice, Veracity, and Sanctity: also of the Trinity.

God's Justice, Absolute and Ordinate. How far God's punitive Justice is necessary. How far God's Justice regards the Qualities of its object. God's Veracity explicated and demonstrated. Also his Sanctity. Platonic Philosophemes of the Trinity, with their Use and Abuse in Theology.

§. 1. The next Attribute to be discussed is the Justice of God; whereof we find great characters both in Sacred and Platonic Philosophy. As for Sacred Philosophy, it sets forth the Justice of God in lively colors.

Psalms 19:9: "The Judgements of the Lord are true and righteous." Psalms 36:6: "Thy righteousness is like the great mountains." Psalms 119:137: "Righteous art thou, O Lord, and upright are thy judgements."

Here are two distinct particulars assigned to the Justice of God: (1) He is righteous, and (2) His judgements are upright. Men may be just and lovers of Justice, and yet their Judgements not upright. But it is not so with God.

The same is found in Psalms 50:6, 96:10, 98:9, and 99:4. Also in Isaiah 28:17: "Judgement also will I lay to the line, and righteousness to the plummet." This is a metaphor taken from the practice of masons or carpenters, who, when they want to have something done exactly, do it by line and level, as in Amos 7:8. So accurate and exquisite are the Judgements of God.

Romans 2:2: "But we are sure that the judgement of God is according to truth." Reason itself dictates as much to us: were He not just, He were not God. "According to truth," or justice: for so the term here imports, and it is opposed to the Roman Judgements, which were at this time most unjust. He adds the reason in verse 11: "For there is no respect of persons with God."

The term "signifies the face"; from the face or from: thence it signifies (1) that which is applied to or bound about the face: a mask or person. For persona, from and, according to its primary notion, signifies a visor or one who wears it. (2) The face, that part which was covered with the mask or visor. Thence, (3) the whole man, or person, considered essentially and substantially. (4) Also the external figure, form, quality, or disposition of a person considered accidentally. Hence, "to accept the person" is to accept or regard any external qualities, relations, dispositions, or conditions of the person, which ought not to come under consideration in judgement.

Matthew 20:21: "answers to the Hebrew term, lifting up the face; and to lift up the face is the same as to accept the face or person." For in those times, the ancient gesture of salutation was by casting the face down on the earth: and he who was saluted lifted up the face of him who saluted, as David did with Saul. This custom yet continues in those Oriental parts. From this custom of salutation, it was translated to signify the acceptance of the person, contrary to the merits of the cause or thing. To respect a person is when that in judgement is respected, which ought not to come into judgement. When God is said not to respect persons, the notion of person does not denote a man, but the condition of a man, which ought not to be regarded. Acceptation of persons is only when favor or affection, or the like extrinsic considerations prevail, contrary to equity: in this regard, God cannot be said to accept persons, because He is under no obligation or laws of justice, more than what His own free will has brought Him under.

Plato discusses accurately God's Justice in "Laws" 10, page 904.

There, an objection is raised by a juvenile wit, stating that although God regards human affairs, it would be easy for wicked men, by gifts and favors, to gain His favor. To this, Plato replies: "But neither you nor any other may be thought ever so far to prevail with God by prayers, that he should exempt himself from divine judgement, or decline the tribunal of God: for he has firmly determined that no mortal shall escape it. For you are never neglected by this judgement; no, even if you were so small as to creep into the profundity of the earth; nor if you were so sublime as to fly into the heavens; but you shall suffer deserved punishment, either here or in hell."

Then he adds, on page 906: "This oration is used by those who affirm that God can be easily reconciled to unjust men, as if he would consent to divide the spoil with sinners, even when they sin, just as if the wolves should give a small portion of their prey to the dogs; and these, being pacified with their gifts, should give the wolves leave to devour the sheep. Is this not the import of their oration, who conceive God to be easily reconciled to wicked men?"

He concludes on page 907: "Is not God of all keepers the greatest, and employed in the greatest affairs? Can we then imagine that He, who keeps the best things and excels infinitely in the art and faculty of keeping, is worse than dogs or poor mortals, who yet cannot be bribed by rewards from wicked men, given with an ill intent, to do what is unjust?"

Plato compares God to a shepherd's dog, which cannot be bribed by the wolves to deliver up the sheep for prey: much less, he says, can God be bribed to act unjustly. So in "Laws" 4, 716: "Justice is the avenger of those that come short of the divine law."

To fully explicate the Justice of God, we must distinguish between His Absolute Justice and that which is Ordinate.

God's Absolute Justice is founded on the infinite perfection of His essence and shares the same idea as His sovereign dominion over His creatures. The majesty of God is so great, and His dominion so absolute, that He is subject to no laws, obligations, or ties from His creatures. This absolute justice or dominion does not regard any qualities or conditions of its object; thus, God can, by virtue thereof, inflict the highest torments on His innocent creatures and exempt the most guilty from punishment.
By this Absolute Justice and Dominion, God can inflict the greatest torments, even of Hell itself, on the most innocent creature. Every creature, as such, is subordinate to God, both in suffering and doing as He pleases. Suarez states, "We must deny that God, as Supreme Lord, cannot inflict on an innocent man all the evil that is in the torments of Hell." Thus, God has full dominion over His creatures, to use them as He pleases for any use that does not involve a contradiction. There is no justice properly termed in respect of the creatures whereby God stands obliged to them, antecedent to the constitution of His own will. Denying God absolute dominion to dispose of His creatures as He pleases is unjust. God did indeed inflict the highest torments on an innocent, pure, spotless creature—the human nature of His own Son. Those who deny God's absolute dominion over His creatures deny Him as their Creator. God, who made all things, must have the power to order all to the ends He made them for. If God should make an innocent creature to destroy it to illustrate the glory of His power, who can say He is unjust? The greatest notions that our minds can frame are too narrow to express the absolute dominion of God over His creatures.
1. God's punitive justice is not necessarily essential. By reason of His absolute justice and dominion, God could freely pardon sinners without satisfaction. Here arises the grand question: Is the vindictive or punitive justice of God necessary? There is a division among great and holy divines: some affirming, others denying. Though I may not be able to reconcile such extremes, I offer some points for consideration.
  - Distinguish between the merit of punishment and the actual adjudging of sinners to punishment.
  - Distinguish between the obligation on God to punish and the obligation on the sinner to receive punishment.
  - Distinguish between natural necessity and moral necessity.
  - Distinguish between natural congruity and natural necessity.
  - Distinguish between God's absolute justice or dominion and His ordinate justice.
Given these distinctions, we offer the following propositions to determine the question and reconcile the extremes:
(1) All sin necessarily merits punishment, although actual punishment is not absolutely and physically necessary for the vindication of Divine Justice. Sin has guilt necessarily attached to it, which implies a merit of punishment. Yet actual punishment is not absolutely necessary for vindication.
(2) There is a necessary obligation on the sinner to receive punishment, although there is not an absolute obligation on God to punish the sinner. Guilt is a moral accident or debt that binds the offender to suffer punishment. On God's part, it implies a moral right or power of punishing, but not an absolute necessity.
(3) God has a natural right to punish sin, yet He does so freely, not from a necessity of nature. God justly punishes sin, but considering His absolute justice, He would not be unjust if He did not punish it. If God's punishing sin were from a necessity of nature, He would punish as necessarily as He loves Himself, making it impossible to relax penal laws or accept a mediator's satisfaction.
(4) While God is not naturally compelled to punish sin, He is morally compelled to vindicate His justice as the world's ruler. This moral necessity obliges God to demonstrate His displeasure against sin by punishing it.
(5) Although God could let sin go unpunished by His absolute dominion, He necessarily punishes it by His ordinate justice. We should consider not what God can do by absolute justice but what He can do by ordinate justice and moral constitution. Thus, God must punish sin without satisfaction and would be unjust if He did not.

God's ordinate justice has a necessary relation to some quality in its object, affected or constituted in a specific manner. This quality being supposed, its execution on its object is necessary, not by physical necessity but by moral necessity or natural congruity, subsequent to the free constitution of the Divine Will, to manifest the Divine Glory. This ordinate justice of God, as usually taken in sacred philosophy, is the attribute whereby God executes the decrees and constitutions of His sovereign will and word, for the manifestation of His glory. This implies several particular ideas, which we will explicate in the following propositions.

Proposition 1: God's Ordinate Justice Arises from His Free Will

God's ordinate justice arises from the free constitution and determination of His own will. Antecedently to the will of God, nothing is so far just that it ought to be, but only that it may be justly and conveniently done if God wills it. There is no law of justice in the actions of God but what His own will prescribes. The will of God is not circumscribed by His justice, but His justice by His will. For nothing is just in divine actions but what He wills, and because He wills it. Thus, Carthusianus, in 4. Dist. 46. Quaest. 1, states: "The whole order of justice is originally reduced to the divine will. Whatever God wills is just, and His will is not properly restrained by justice." Similarly, Scotus, l. 4. Dist. 46. Quaest. 1, affirms: "That is always just which is actually willed by the divine will, and because it is actually willed by the divine will."

The rule of justice for humans ties them to one part of the contradiction, making them unjust if they act otherwise. However, no such rule of justice is affixed to God beyond what His own will has determined. God's revealed will is a rule of justice to us, His creatures, but His absolute sovereign will alone regulates Him in all His actions. Therefore, learned Davenant states: "That God cannot will anything but salva justitia, i.e., He can do nothing contra justitiam; yet He may will and do many things praeter justitiam, i.e., He may freely decree and do many things where salva justitia, He might as freely have decreed and done the contrary." Similarly, Lombard, l. 1. Dist. 43, posits: "God could have omitted what He does and done what He omits without injustice."

Proposition 2: God's Ordinate Justice and His Veracity

God's ordinate justice towards the creature has the same idea as His veracity or fidelity. In sacred philosophy, the righteousness of God is often equated with His veracity and fidelity in fulfilling His word. For example, Psalm 119:123 states: "For the word of Thy righteousness," i.e., the word of Thy promise, which Thy righteousness or fidelity is obliged to fulfill. Similarly, Psalms 31:1 and 89:14 echo this sentiment. There is no justice properly termed in God that obliges Him to His creature. What we call the justice of God towards His creature is essentially His fidelity, which presupposes some constitution of the divine will. Abstracting such a constitution, God cannot be said to do anything repugnant to His justice. Justice, in its general idea, means giving everyone their due. But what can the creature claim as its own apart from what it receives from the divine will? Justice implies a conformity or equality according to the obligation or debt which everyone falls under. However, any obligation or debt related to God and His creature stems from His own goodness and will. Thus, God's justice is to act according to the congruence or fittingness of His own veracity or goodness, as the Scholastics determine.

Proposition 3: No Acception of Persons with God

There can be no partiality or acception of persons charged to God. Romans 2:11 clearly states this. The reasons are evident:

Acception of persons applies only to someone obliged to distribute justice, not according to their pleasure, but according to certain qualities, reasons, or conditions inherent or appended to the persons to whom justice is distributed. God, however, is under no obligation but that which flows from His sovereign pleasure to distribute rewards or punishments to anyone.
Acception of persons does not apply to the distribution of purely gratuitous and free good things, only to those of debt. God's distributions of good things are purely gratuitous. Aquinas states: "Acception of persons is only of a thing due; and therefore it cannot be ascribed to God. None can owe anything to another unless they depend on or have received something from another. But God depends on no one, nor does He receive anything from any other." Acception of persons occurs only where, in the dispensation of things due, someone favors one over another concerning some circumstance of the person, contrary or besides the merits of the cause. Hence, even if God gives unequally to persons equal out of His mere liberality, it is not acception of persons because nothing is due.

Proposition 4: The Difference Between the Justice of God and Men

There is an infinite distance between the justice of God and that of men:

All human justice arises from obligation and debt, but God's justice arises from the mere free constitution of His will. Man wills things because they are just; things are just with God because He wills them.
Many things unjust with men are just with God. The rule of justice that binds men to act justly renders them unjust when they act otherwise. However, where God has not obligated Himself by His own free constitution and promise, He has the liberty of acting or not acting, of doing this or the contrary in the distribution of rewards and gifts. If He did not do what He does, or if He did what He does not, His justice remains the same. If God spoils the Egyptians to enrich His people or enriches the Assyrians by the spoils of His people, He is still just. Where God has not obligated Himself by His own word, He has the liberty of doing one thing or the contrary without injustice.

Proposition 5: God's Ordinate Justice Regards the Qualities of Its Object

As far as God has obliged Himself by the constitution of His will and word, His ordinate justice always regards the constitution and qualities of the object. God's ordinate justice, being the same as His veracity and fidelity, always respects such qualities and conditions as its object, by reason of His own constitution, is invested with. In executing His ordinate justice, God assumes the role of a judge, and a judge cannot duly abstain from administering justice. Justice is duly administered only when the qualities of the objects and the merits of the cause are fully inspected and considered. God's ordinate justice, as Rector and Judge of all, is primarily exercised in reducing all things to the equality and order prescribed by His divine wisdom and will. Hence, these two things necessarily follow from this divine ordinate justice:

It never exerts itself but where the qualities and conditions prescribed to its object are found. It never punishes any but for sin; it never rewards any but the godly.
Wherever these conditions or qualities are found, it necessarily exerts itself. It must punish sin wherever it exists; it must reward holiness if sincere. There is a moral, not physical, necessity attending all its expressions, stemming from the free constitution of the divine will.

§. 2. Next to the Justice of God, we are to discourse of His Veracity and Fidelity, which is not really distinct from His Ordinate Justice.

Thence we find the Justice of God frequently put for His Fidelity. So Psalm 31:1:

"Deliver me in Thy Righteousness," i.e., according to Thy Righteousness, whereby Thou dost declare Thyself just in making good Thy promises. Some make this distinction between God's Verity, Fidelity, and Justice: God's Verity obliges Him to this, that He promises sincerely; His Fidelity, that He keeps His promise; and His Justice, that He performs His promise by giving the thing promised.

Touching the veracity of God, we find lively illustrations and notices both in Sacred and Platonic Philosophy. As for Sacred Philosophy, it is most expressive in asserting God's Veracity.

So Genesis 22:16: "By Myself have I sworn, saith Jehovah."

Assuredly that, or the faithful saying, is peculiar to God's Oracles, which are all faithful sayings, 1 Timothy 1:15 and 3:1. Of the same letters transposed comes also Amen, which notes the faithfulness of God.

Thus Isaiah 25:1: "For Thou hast done wonderful things, Thy counsels of old are faithfulness and truth."

In faithfulness and firmness. Gataker conceives the word here to note firmness rather than true or truth; because the word, in the singular nowhere else found, is used in the plural for pillars, 2 Kings 18:16. The Veracity of God is further explicated,

1 Samuel 15:29: "The Eternity of Israel will not lie."

Eternity signifies both eternity and strength, which are both great pillars of the Divine Veracity.

So Psalm 33:4: "The word of the Lord is right, and all His works are done in truth." Psalm 18:20: "As for God, His way is perfect."

This seems to be meant of the veracity and constance of His promises. Thence it follows:

"The Word of the Lord is tried, examined, i.e., pure, sincere, like silver well refined, neither do they ever fail," Psalm 12:6.

So Psalm 36:5: "Thy faithfulness reacheth to the clouds," i.e., it is immense and infinite.

The space between us and the clouds is vast, and seemingly immense.

Thus Psalm 89:1: "I will sing of the mercies of the Lord."

By Mercies, Kimhi and Ezra understand God's free Constitution antecedent to His promise. Whence it follows:

"With my mouth will I make known Thy faithfulness."

Mercy makes the promise, but Fidelity is engaged for the performance of it.

So verse 2, 3 and verse 8: "O Lord God of Hosts, who is a strong God like unto Thee? Or to Thy faithfulness round about Thee?"

He ties God with His promise, in regard of His Veracity and Fidelity in making good His promises. Then he adds, that God's faithfulness is round about Him, which is a poetic description, denoting that God is always and in every posture or regard most faithful. And he proceeds in the following verses to declare the benefit of this fidelity of God: particularly verse 33:

"Nor suffer My faithfulness to fail. Neither will I lie against My Truth, or in My Truth: I will not violate My Veracity, by not performing My promise."

So verse 34: "My Covenant will I not break, I will not profane My Covenant, or offer violence to it."

Again, verse 35: "Once have I sworn by My Holiness that I will not lie unto David," i.e., irrevocably, as Kimhi and Ezra.

If I lie to David. The particle if, being used as a formula in swearing, doth generally denote. The ancient Patriarchs were wont, under this formula, by a kind of commination, to testify that the action of evil on the head of him that swore if he did violate his faith. The great God affirms this formula of swearing from Himself, thereby to declare the firmitude of His Veracity and Fidelity in performing His oath. All this is lively explicated, Hebrews 6:17, 18:

"God being willing more abundantly to show to the heirs of promise, the immutability of His counsel, engaged His fidelity by an oath: That by two immutable things, in which it was impossible for God to lie, or to deceive."

For Grotius conceives to be rendered, which signifies an event that frustrates expectation, as Leviticus 6:2, Joel 2:47, Esa. 58:2, Hosea 1:2, Hab. 3:17. God's providences do not seem to cross His promises, and to frustrate our expectations, but really there is not the least mutability on God's part: He cannot lie or deceive, being bound by two immutable things, His word and oath, which give abundant assurance of His fidelity.

Plato also gives very great and illustrious notices of the veracity of God, and those not a little conformable to Sacred Philosophy. Thus, Republic. 2. p. 382:

"Dost thou not know, that both God and men do truly hate a lie?"

And then he adds the reason:

"That there is no mortal who would in his soul either deceive, or be deceived, or be ignorant, or be involved in the darkness of a lie, as to supreme beings."

Then he subjoins:

"Truly a lie should be hated, not only by God, but also by men."

Then he adds:

"That we imagine that a lie is useful to God? What, therefore, because He understands not ancient things, etc.?"

Whence he concludes:

"Wherefore God is both simple and faithful, both in work and word: neither is He himself changed, neither doth He deceive others, neither by phantastic allusions, neither by words, neither by signs, neither by visions, neither by dreams."

Plato here enumerates the several ways whereby God reveals Himself, in each of which His veracity is most illustrious. Whence he makes this law for the right establishment of religion,

"That men speak and believe touching God, that He is no deceiver, or seducer of others, either by words, or otherwise."

But to discourse more philosophically of the veracity of God, we must first distinguish Verity in the general, which is either simple or complex.

Simple verity is either in the mind, or in things themselves. Simple truth in the mind confines to the conformity of our notions unto things. And in this regard, the truth of God imports the verity of His ideas, or knowledge of things. Simple truth in things is nothing but their conformity to their specific idea, or formal definition and nature. So we say, that is true gold, which conforms to the specific idea of gold. This some Aristotelians file Metaphysic or transcendental truth; others physic truth, it being no other than the real existence of things. For, as Aristotle, or whoever were the compiler of that book, Metaph. min. 1. l. 1. c. 1. observes, every thing has so much of truth, as it has of existence. Now the verity of God in this regard is nothing else save the simple pure actuality of His essence and existence.
Complex truth is either mental or oral.
Complex mental truth is the conformity of complex mental ideas, notions, or propositions unto things, which cannot be ascribed to God, because He has no complex knowledge, but only simple; albeit He knows all propositions, yet it is not by any complex notions, but in the most simple glass of His own essence.
Complex oral verity is either logic or ethic: logic oral verity is when propositions or discourses agree with things: ethic oral verity is when our words agree to our thoughts, which is termed sincerity, or our deeds to our words, which is veracity.

This veracity as to God regards all His words; but in a more particular manner His Comminations or Threats, and Promises; yet with this difference.

Promises give a right to the persons to whom they are made, which cannot be taken from them without injury; for albeit it be free to any to make a promise; yet having made it, his fidelity is obliged to see it performed. So that in promises there is no room for relaxation or dispensation; but the words must be made good in the largest sense, and as most favorable for the persons to whom the promise is made: according to that common maxime in civil law, favors must be amplified. And that which adds to the obligation of promises is when they are confirmed by an oath, which renders them every way immutable and irrevocable. Such are all the promises of God, as Hebrews 6:17, where God is said to confirm His promise by an oath, whereby it becomes every way immutable, as verse 18.
But as to comminations or threats, there is no right or debt accrues to the persons, to whom they are made, save only a debt or merit of punishment: the threat renders them obnoxious to punishment, if they break that law whereunto the threat is appended: yet in many cases, especially as to circumstances, the superior, who made the law and affixed a threat thereto, has a liberty of relaxing, or dispensing with the penalty of His law. The commination declares the merit of punishment in the offender, and the power of punishing in the superior offended; but yet it doth not always suppose a necessary egress or execution of vindictive justice for punishing the offender; at least not as to all circumstances threatened; but still there remains place in the breast of the judge, or superior, especially if he be absolute and sovereign, either to relax or dispense with the penalty of his laws, either in whole or part. Thus in God's threats and penal laws, He reserves to Himself a liberty of relaxation or dispensation in many cases, thereby to make way for His clemence or mercy, without the least violation of His veracity or justice. So in the first commandment or penal law, Genesis 2:17:

"Thou shalt surely die."

The Hebrew in dying thou shalt die, which Hebraisme denotes a certain, immediate, perfect, and constant death. And yet our Sovereign Lord, out of His sovereign rich mercy, was pleased very far to relax and mitigate the rigor of this commination or penal law, as to many circumstances, by admitting of a mediator and new evangelical covenant. In this regard, God is laid to repent or alter the line of His wrath, as Jonah 3:9:

"Who can tell if God will turn and repent, and turn away from His fierce anger, that we perish not."

God by reason of their legal imperfect faith and repentance, turned away His fierce wrath for that time, albeit afterward it came down with vengeance, as history informs us. Neither is it to be feared, lest the veracity of God should receive any injury if all His threats are not always in all circumstances or parts fulfilled: because all comminations and threats, which have not some character or line of irrevocability affixed to them, are, according to their own nature, to be understood, as not to diminish the right of the superior, who makes them, to relax the same. Thus we see what latitude the divine veracity admits in fulfilling comminations and threats, beyond what can be admitted in fulfilling divine promises, as Grotius well observes.

God's Veracity and Fidelity Demonstrated

God's veracity and fidelity in fulfilling His word is founded in and may be demonstrated by (1) His essential verity. Plato makes God to be the first Truth, yea, Truth itself, whence He cannot but be true and faithful in His words. God is Truth essentially, not participatively, therefore nothing but truth can proceed from Him. Again, God is pure truth or verity, with whom not the least shadow of falsity, hypocrisy, or fraud in word or deed can mingle. Pure truth and falsity are incompatible. There are no thoughts or ideas of man’s heart to be true, but there is some mixture of error or falsity in them: no words or deeds so sincere and faithful, but something of hypocrisy and falsity mixed with them: because there is no pure truth in man's thoughts or words. But God being the first, pure, essential verity, His veracity is most pure and perfect, without the least shadow of falsity.

God’s Veracity is founded on and may be demonstrated by His eternity and omnipotence. Thus in sacred philosophy, 1 Samuel 15:29:

"The Eternity or Strength of Israel will not lie."

All lies are from impotence and infirmity: truth and veracity is ever potent and strong; but falsity is most impotent.

From the Holiness of God, of which we had immediately discoursed. I conclude this divine attribute with a pleasing observation I long since met with in the life of Janenius, Bishop of Ipre, that great patron of divine grace, who being demanded, What attribute of God was most in his heart, whereby he was most awed? replied, The Truth or Veracity of God. And he that writes his life, prefixed to his Augustinus, assures us, that in his garden-walks and solitary meditations, with his eyes fixed on heaven, he was oft seen and heard to break forth into this acclamation: O Truth! So great an admirer was he of divine verity and veracity: and indeed no wonder, seeing it is the great spring of the divine life and consolation both here and hereafter.

§. 3. The Sanctitie or Holinesse of God

The last divine attribute we are to discourse of is the sanctity or holiness of God, whereof we find great and illustrious characters in sacred philosophy.

We find the sanctity of God set forth in Scripture in a way of eminence and distinction from all created sanctity. So Exodus 15:11:

"Who is like unto Thee, O Lord, amongst the gods, or mighty men! Who is like unto Thee, glorious in holiness, etc.?"

Where He places God's transcendent eminence and elevation above all creatures, as that wherein His essential sanctity chiefly consists. And indeed the peerless eminence of God's sacred majesty is that wherein His sanctity chiefly consists, as we intend more fully to demonstrate. Thus 1 Samuel 2:2:

"There is none holy as the Lord: for there is none besides Thee: neither is there any rock like our God."

Hannah here, as Moses before, places the sanctity of God in His supreme eminence above all creatures.

Hence, God is frequently brought in as an object of divine worship, with regard to His holiness. So Psalm 30:4:

"Give thanks at the remembrance of His holiness," i.e., of His peerless eminence.

And Psalm 71:22:

"Unto thee will I sing with the harp, O thou holy One of Israel."

Psalm 92:12:

"And give thanks at the remembrance of His holiness."

The arm or the arm of His holiness, i.e., of His holy power so much above all other powers. The like Psalm 99:3:

"Let them praise Thy great and terrible name: for it is holy."

Also verse 9:

"Exalt the Lord our God, and worship at His holy hill: for the Lord our God is holy."

The like verse 5.

As God is a transcendent superlative majesty, exalted above all other gods or majesties, as Exodus 15:11. So in all acts of worship we must exalt Him, by giving Him a singular, incommunicable, peculiar worship. Whence in Scripture those that give that worship which is due to God, either immediate or immediate, are said to profane His holy name, Ezekiel 20:39, 43:7, 8. Because God's holiness, consisting in a superlative incommunicable majesty, admits no corival in point of worship. Hence, to sanctify the holy name or majesty of God, is (1) to revere and glorify Him; because of His transcendent eminence; and (2) to do it with a peculiar, separate, incommunicated worship; because He is holy and separate above all things else. Not to do the former is irreligion, profaneness, and atheism; not to do the latter is idolatry and superstition, as judicious Mede well observes. Hence (3) God is said to sit on a throne of holiness, Psalm 47:8:

"God sitteth upon the throne of His holiness."

Alluding to the thrones of princes, which were in the midst of the people, exalted and lifted up, that their majesty might appear more illustrious. God being, by reason of His transcendent eminence, exalted infinitely above all creatures, is therefore said to sit on the throne of His holiness.

We find God's holiness, in a most eminent manner and with emphatic characters, proclaimed by Himself as have any views of God. Thus Isaiah 6:3:

"Holy, holy, holy is the Lord of Hosts."

So Revelation 4:8.

The sanctity of God is sometimes described by rectitude. Psalm 25:8:

"Good and upright is the Lord."

So Psalm 92:15:

"To show that the Lord is upright."

We find also in Plato many great notices of the sanctity of God, conformable to those of sacred philosophy. So Theaetetus, page 176:

"Evils find no place with God."

Again, God is in no manner unrighteous, but as it seems most righteous. So Republic. 2. page 379. He saith, that in theology we should use such modules, as come nearest to the nature of God, and demonstrate what God is. Thus we must constantly ascribe to God things conentaneous to His nature. Whence he subjoins: Must we not determine then, that God is indeed good? But no good is noxious. But that which hurts not, doth it do any evil? No surely. Whence he concludes: Good therefore is not the cause of all things, but of those things that are good it is the cause; but of evils it is not the cause: i.e., God is the first cause and author of all natural and moral good, but as for moral evil He is not the author or cause thereof as it is evil; because moral evil as such has no efficient cause but only deficient. Thence he adds: Of good things we must own one principal cause but God: but as for evils we must inquire after some other cause of them; for God must be deemed the cause of them. His mind is, that God must be owned as the cause of all good, both natural and moral; yea, of the material but not the formal cause of sin, as sin is a deordination or deviation from the divine law, that is proper to the sinner. God concurs to the proper moral cause of sin, as in its deordination or deviation from the divine law, that is proper to the sinner. God concurs to the material entire of sin, which is a natural good: but as to its formal cause, sin as sin, He concurs not thereunto. Hence he subjoins, we must not at attribute evils to God, for if we do, it must be in that manner as before, namely, in that wherein he concurs not to them as wicked and justly has inflicted those punishments on men, that thereby He might bring some profit. Whence he concludes: God therefore is not the author of moral evils, not as such wherewith He concurs not. Whence he concludes: So that God, who is good, must be the author or moral cause of evil to any, thus we must with all manner of contention refute, and not suffer any in the city to speak or hear such things.

Plato strongly affirms that God is the principal cause of all good, but not of sin as sin; i.e., He neither commands, invites, encourages, nor by any other moral causality produces sin. Albeit God doth concur to the material act or physic entity of sin, which is naturally good, yet He doth not at all concur to the moral production, obliquity or deordination of sin, which has indeed no real efficient cause, but only deficient, according to that of Proclus: There is no Idea of moral evils. But the more distinctly and yet concisely to explicate the sanctity of God, we are to know that His original essential and absolute holiness is nothing else but the incommunicable superlative or supereminence of His divine majesty, as separate from all things else. For all sanctity, and all the notions thereof, especially Grecian and Hebraic, imply separation and distinction. Whence the sacred majesty of God, being, in regard of His infinite perfection and dignity, infinitely exalted above all beings and dignities whatsoever, it must necessarily be the prime fantastic. Yea, holiness is so far appropriated to the first being, as that the heathens ascribed a fictitious fanatic and eminence to all their spurious deities: whereby they generally acknowledged, that the prime holiness belongs only to the first being. Thus true, good angels and men are holy by participation and derivation; but they are not holiness in the abstract: this appertains only to the prime, original, essential holiness, who is infinitely separate from all other dignities and eminences: in whom all holiness is in the abstract and essentially; from whom also all holiness flows as from the source and spring.

§. 4. Platonic Philosophemes of the Trinity

We find in Plato not only characters of the divine essence and attributes, but also some dark notices of the Trinity; which, I no way doubt, were originally traduced from the sacred fountain of Hebraic philosophy. We have Plato’s sentiments about a trinity mentioned more expressly in his successors, Plotinus, Porphyry, Iamblichus and Proclus. And the whole is well explicated by Cyril Alexandr. Contra Jul. I. 1. p. 34. Edit. Paril. 1638. thus: For Porphyry, expounding the sentiment of Plato, faith, that the essence of God proceeds even to three hypostases; but that the supreme God is, the supreme good; and that after him, the second is, the prime officer or creator; moreover, that the third is, the mundane soul (or universal spirit); for the divine extended it self to the soul of the universe. This Platonic trinity Cyril refutes, as that which gave spawn and seed to Arianisme, as hereafter. I am not ignorant, that Learned Cudworth, in his New Book, against Atheisme, B. 1. C. 4. S. 34. p. 590. &c. endeavors to apologize for this Platonic trinity, and reconcile it with the Christian: yet he ingenuously acknowledged, page 580, and 601, &c. That the most refined Platonic trinity supposeth an essential dependence and subordination of the second hypostasis, to the first, and of the third to the second: Yea, he grants, that the Platonists generally held these three hypostases to be three distinct gods, as in what follows. I conceive those endeavors to reconcile the Christians trinity with the Platonic, to be of most dangerous consequence, and that which proved Origen’s pelse, as Part. 3. B. 2. C. 1. S. 1. §. 8.

The chief place I find in Plato, wherein he gives us some dark adumbration of a trinity, is Epit. 6. p. 323. Let this law be constituted by you, and confirmed by an oath, not without obteining, God, the imperator of all things, both which are, and which had be; and the father of that imperator and cause: whom indeed, if every philosopher, the zeal of all directly know, for has that knowledge may withstand the power of belief in men. This chief God of God Clements Alexandrinus and others interpret of God the Father. And in Plato's Epinom. mention of, as elsewhere. We also find in Plato’s Epinom. mention of, the trinity. Whence the poets that are in theology, the mind of Jupiter, or his wisdom, which they use revelation of Plato, and his trinitie. Hence, he is entitled by them, the father of God. And hence in the manner as those who follow Arius, he divides and supposes subjects, inducing hypostases subordinate among themselves, and conceits the Holy and consubstantial trinity to be three distinct gods. But albeit learned Cudworth, B. 1. C. 4. p. 590. against Atheisme, endeavors to wipe off this aspersion, yet he grants the conclusion, as hereafter. But to speak the truth, I find no express mention of a trinity in Plato; only he speaks confusedly of a Father Lord, and of a mind, &c. But among the later Platonists of the school of Alexandria, especially those of the golden succession, the sectators of Ammonius, Plotinus, Porphyry, Iamblichus, Proclus, we find frequent mention and notices of a trinity, which they thus distinguish. (1) the supreme self-being: whom also they title, the one, and the good. (2) the divine mind, the creator or framer of things: who is also termed by them, the word, and the seminal word or reason, that gives being to all things. (3) the soul of the universe: and the first soul, as c. 8. §. 2. The more distinct notices of a trinity, I am very apt to persuade myself they received not too much from Plato, but from Ammonius, the famed head of that succession; who was either a Christian, or a friend to their sacred philosophy, out of which he stole most of his philosophy, and incorporated them into the body of his Platonic philosophy, in order to a refinement thereof: which, albeit his design might be good, yet it proved the apple and fuel of the Christian theologie, at least among the of that school. For Origen, his scholar, following steps, out of too fond a love for Platonic philosophy, reduced his sacred philosophy to Platonic dogmes: which proved the original cause of the greatest errors that befel the church in succeeding ages. Thus he makes the three persons in the trinity, be, according to the three Platonic hypostases, one, not in essence, but only so. Origen contra Celsum, L. 1. p. 386. (Edit. Cantabr. 1658.) Where having cited that, Acts. 4.32. There was of a believers one heart and one soul, he brings it to prove what our Lord affirms, John 10.30. I and the Father are one. And hence in what follows concludes thus: &c. Therefore we religiously worship the Father of Truth, and the Son who is Truth, as being truly two in hypostase, but one in concord, content, and identity of will: so that whosoever sees the Son, shall in him see God, as in the image of God, &c. Hence Origen, in imitation of the Platonists supposed an essential dependence of the Son, the second hypostasis, on the Father; as also of the Spirit, the third, on the Son: of which essential dependence and subordination, see Cudworth against Atheisme, L. 1. C. 4. p. 581, &c. Yea Origen, in his comments on John with needless upas. Thus, that the word in divine things is taken only metaphorically. How far Origen's Platonic philosophemes laid the foundation for the Arian and other heresies touching the second and third person in the trinitie, see Court Gent. P. 3. l. 2. c. 1. s. 8, 9. Samothracians also had his pestiferous influxions from Plotinus's philosophemes about the divine and Arius his from the same schoole, as we have more fully proved in our discourse of the vanitie of philosophie, B. 2. C. 1. s. 8. But whereas Amelius of old, and some late Socinians would perswade us, that John borrowed his John 1.1. from Plato, it's evident, that he had it from the sacred philosophie among the Hebrews: for in the ancient Chaldaic Thargum we find frequent mention of the Word of Jehovah, whereby they understood the Messias, as Gen. 3:8. Psalm 21.2. and 27.1. as elsewhere. Yea Cellus would needs perswade us, that the Christians came to call their Jesus, the Son of God, from their Pagan Ancestors, who called the Word made by God, the Son of God: but this is refuted by Origen, Contra Celsum, L 6. p. 308. Edit. 1658. Where he proves, that this character of Jesus was to be found in the writings of Moses and the prophets, who writ long before the Grecian philosophers. What the trode confused notices of a trinity among the Platonists were originally borrowed from sacred philosophie, see Clem. Alexand. Strom. 5. pag. 456. Eusebius, praep. Evangel. l. 11. from cap. 14. to 23. Philopatr. in Epitom. edit. Cant. 1634. John 1:1. 2. and 3. l. 3. c. 4. 1. c. 13. also Court. Gent. P. 1. B. 2. c. 2. §. 5.

Learned Cudworth, in his book "Against Atheism," B. 1. C. 4. Sect. 35. p. 548, says:

"We may reasonably conclude, that which Proclus asserts of this Trinity, as it was contained in the Chaldaic Oracles, to be true, that it was at first [...], a theology of divine tradition or revelation, or a divine cabala, viz. amongst the Hebrews first, and from them afterwards communicated to the Egyptians and other nations. However," he adds, "we freely acknowledge that, as this divine cabala was but little understood by many of those who entertained it among the pagans, so was it by diverse of them much depraved and adulterated."

For (1) the pagans universally called this their Trinity, a Trinity of Gods, [...], and [...], the First, the Second, and the Third God. (2) Whence, p. 557, he proceeds to demonstrate that the direct design of this Platonic Trinity was nothing else but to lay a foundation for infinite polytheism, cosmolatry, and creature worship. Where, by the way, he well observes that these pagans (who so much cried up this Platonic Trinity) were the only public and professed champions against Christianity and the Christian Trinity. (3) He adds, p. 559, that the three hypostases or persons asserted by the Christians are truly and really one God, and not one only in will, as Origen and the Platonists avouch. (4) He informs us, p. 564, that Proclus and other of the Platonists intermingle many particular gods with those three universal principles or hypostases of their Trinity, as noes, minds or intellects superior to the first soul; and henades and agathotetes, unities and goodnesses, superior to the first intellect too; thereby making those particular beings, which must needs be creatures, superior to those hypostases that are universal and infinite. So great confusions, yea contradictions attend the Platonic Trinity, which yet is too much admired.

Source: Theophilus Gale, The Court of the Gentiles. Part IV. Of reformed philosophy in which Plato's moral and metaphysical philosophy, or Plato's primordial philosophy, is reduced to a useful form and method. BOOK II: On Metaphysical or Primordial Philosophy: in which Plato's Metaphysical Philosophems are methodized and improved.

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